The purpose of this paper is to develop Minskyan financial fragility indices for the government sector and to examine the financial structure of the Greek government before and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. We provide empirical evidence that clearly shows the growing financial fragility of the Greek public sector in the 2000's. We also assess the effectiveness of the implemented bailout adjustment programmes in Greece and claim that the conducted austerity measures and fiscal consolidation have not significantly improved the financial posture of the Greek government sector. We argue that the implementation of fiscal and wage austerity in an economy that lacks structural competitiveness produces prolonged recession and unemployment with adverse feedback effects on the financial fragility of the government.
Introduction
The current sovereign debt crisis in Greece, as well as the banking and fiscal instability in other Eurozone countries, brings forward the analytical and practical importance of Hyman Minsky's 'financial macroeconomics'. Minsky's (1982; [1986] 2008) major concern was to point out that in monetary production economies instability is endogenous, because investment and capital development tend to rely on fragile financial structures. His 'financial instability hypothesis' examines the way in which economic units, primarily business firms and banks, create assets and liabilities and endogenously influence the cyclical and secular movements in the financial fragility of modern capitalist economies (see e.g. Fazzari and Papadimitriou 1992; Bellofiore and Ferri 2001; .
In spite of the fact that Minsky's theoretical framework basically examines the financial fragility of the private sector, his arguments can be extended to incorporate the financial fragility of the government sector (see Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição 2010) . Minsky has argued in favour of the significance of his well-known hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes for the government sector (see e.g. Minsky 1982, 32-33; 1992, 28) . However, his argumentation has largely concentrated on sovereign countries in which the government sector appears to be a potential source of financial stability. He has not explicitly considered the case of nonsovereign countries in which the government sector might be a potential source of financial instability. Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) , Sawyer (2001) , Bell (2003) , 3 Wray (2003) , Sardoni and Wray (2006) and Kelton and Wray (2009) have pointed out that the financial posture of the government sector of non-sovereign countries matters, because these countries cannot finance their expenditures and debt obligations by issuing their own currency. They have also argued that within the current institutional structure of the Eurozone the non-sovereign government spending depends on the perceived credit risk of government bonds in the financial markets. If this risk is conceived to be high, then the financing of government expenditures and debt commitments can be disrupted. 1 Moreover, the institutional framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) which does not authorise the latter to function as 'lender of last resort' to the government sector of the Eurozone countries is the major reason that their sovereign bonds in the global financial markets face default risk.
2 Government bond markets can discipline the countries with high and rising budget deficits, as exemplified by credit downgrades that place upward pressures on the lending interest rates and the prices of the Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). As long as the ECB does not guarantee the nondefault of the euro states, the debt-financing of the government deficits is susceptible to financial perceptions, the judgments of credit rating agencies and the speculation of investors, especially when these deficits are higher than the percentage defined by the Maastricht Treaty. Consequently, the financial posture of the national government sectors in the Eurozone has become of paramount importance for the analysis and evaluation of economies' financial stability and possibility of default. As the recent sovereign debt crisis has indicated, a government sector with increasing financing needs is 4 susceptible to potential changes in financial perceptions. The latter may lead to its incapability to borrow, with devastating effects on the implementation of fiscal policy as well as on the financial and macroeconomic stability.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a Minskyan framework for the measurement of the government sector's financial fragility and to apply this framework in the case of Greece. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop and propose various indices that enable us to measure the financial fragility of a government that has relinquished its monetary independence. In Section 3, we estimate the proposed indices for the Greek government sector prior and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. We also discuss the ineffectiveness of the implemented austerity policies over the period [2010] [2011] [2012] , showing that they have not significantly improved government sector's financial structure. Section 4 summarises and concludes.
Measuring the financial fragility of a non-sovereign government sector
At the epicentre of Minsky's analysis of financial fragility is his insight that 'borrowing and lending take place on the basis of margins of safety' (Minsky 1982, 74 ; see also Kregel 2008) . The fundamental margin of safety is, according to Minsky, the excess of the expected cash inflows over the expected cash outflows. For a nonsovereign government sector, this margin of safety is given by the excess of the expected inflows from taxation, social contributions, asset ownership, asset liquidation or other sources, over the sum of the expected primary expenditures and the debt commitments (interest and principal repayment).
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The higher the expected cash inflows relative to the expected cash outflows the higher the margin of safety of the government sector. If the expected cash inflows fall short of the expected cash outflows, refinancing is necessary. The willingness of both the government and its lenders to engage into financial relationships that rely on refinancing is a function of financial markets' institutional structure and country's previous fiscal and growth performance. Furthermore, this willingness depends upon government's and borrowers' perception of the appropriate margin of safety and the conceived assuredness of future cash inflows.
We have already remarked in the introductory section that in the Eurozone in which the ECB does not act as 'lender of last resort' to the governments, the government sector can be financially fragile and, hence, a potential source of financial and macroeconomic instability. Therefore, the assessment of the financial structure of the government sector is crucial for the evaluation of the economic system's financial fragility. Drawing on Minsky's analytical framework, we argue that two factors should be taken into consideration in the measurement of the financial fragility of a non-sovereign government sector. First, government's income statement and balance sheet structure from which we can figure out the degree of government's reliance on the well functioning of the financial markets for honouring its debt commitments.
Second, the extent to which the roll-over of government's debt relies upon financial markets' attitudes that can easily change as a result of small expectation shocks. In this context, we propose five indices to measure the financial fragility of a nonsovereign government: (1) the liquidity index, (2) the debt maturity index, (3) the liquid assets to debt ratio, (4) the shares to debt ratio and (5) the non-resident debt index. We proceed to present these indices in turn.
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(1) The liquidity index is based on Minsky's well-known taxonomy of hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance regimes. Extending Minsky's taxonomy, the government sector can be categorised into four regimes according to the relation between cash inflows, primary government expenditures and debt commitments.
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Note that in the constructed index cash inflows refer only to the revenues from the main operations of the government. Thus, they do not include inflows from liquid financial assets or from the sale of less liquid financial assets (the role of these inflows is captured by the liquid assets to debt ratio and the shares to debt ratio; see below).
The first finance regime is the hedge one, in which government is capable of covering all its debt commitments from its primary surplus. Algebraically, it holds that:
where TR denotes the total government revenues, TE stands for the total primary government expenditures, AMORT symbolises the amortisation of debt and INT denotes the interest payments. The hedge finance regime reflects the case in which there is sufficient liquidity to ensure the repayment of the debt obligations without new borrowing.
The second case is that of a speculative government, which can repay its interest without resorting to new borrowing. However, its primary surplus is not enough to cover the principal repayment. The speculative finance regime is characterised by the following relationship:
Government's finance regime is Ponzi when the primary surplus is not enough to cover its interest payments. The relationship between the cash flows of a Ponzi finance regime is expressed as:
Finally, when the government sector exhibits an ultra-Ponzi finance regime, it runs a primary deficit. This implies that a part of government's primary expenditures cannot be covered without new borrowing. The margins of safety are, therefore, at their lowest level. Algebraically, it holds that:
Several important points are in order. First, each of the above-mentioned finance regimes generates certain dynamics in the government's debt and financial commitments. In particular, if the government's finance regime is characterised as Ponzi or ultra-Ponzi, the net debt increases (assuming no changes in asset prices and exchange rates). 5 Since a higher net debt implies more debt commitments and less financial assets in the future, the more a government remains in the Ponzi or ultraPonzi regime, the more difficult it is to improve its liquidity position. This may give rise to problems of debt sustainability, insolvency and loss of credibility. On the 8 contrary, if the government is hedge or speculative its net debt declines. Thus, the risks of illiquidity and insolvency are lower.
However, it should be remarked that the link between the finance regimes and the gross debt to GDP dynamics is not straightforward. The government sector may be for many years in the ultra-Ponzi regime without seeing an explosion in its debt to GDP ratio. This is more likely to be the case when government expenditures have a significant growth-enhancing effect and the real (after-tax) lending interest rate is low relative to the real growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, the government sector may run a primary surplus that proves insufficient to prevent a rise in its debt to GDP ratio due to the existence of a much higher real (after-tax) lending interest rate than the real growth rate of the economy.
Second, the ability of a government to attain and sustain a sufficiently large budget surplus depends on various macroeconomic factors, which may not be directly controlled by itself. According to the 'financial balances approach' (Wray 2006 (Wray , 2012 Godley et al. 2007; Kregel 2011; Sawyer 2011; Semieniuk, van Treeck, and Truger 2011; Zezza 2012) , the financial position of the government is by definition a function of the balances of the private and the foreign sector of the economy. 6 The fiscal balance can improve only if there is a deterioration in the balance of the private sector and/or in the balance of the foreign sector. Thus, a rise in private sector expenditures and/or a rise in exports can improve, everything else given, the fiscal balance without any change in the behaviour of fiscal authorities. On the contrary, cuts in government expenditures may not be effective in reducing a fiscal deficit to a target level if the expenditures of the private and the foreign sector do not increase enough to counter 9 the contractionary effects of these cuts. In this case, the output is adversely affected and the automatic stabilisers may prevent the attainment of the intended balance.
Similarly, a rise in tax rates may have, under certain circumstances, important detrimental effects on output and tax evasion, leading to lower rather than to higher tax revenues. Third, Ponzi and ultra-Ponzi governments might need to take further initiatives to create the liquidity that restores their solvency and credibility. For instance, if there are credit constraints, then the sustainability of a Ponzi, and especially, of an ultraPonzi government sector might require debt restructuring, complement to adequate macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 8 Without debt restructuring, the restoration of a viable financial structure might not be possible. Besides, without debt restructuring money managers and bond holders are likely to speculate on country's default, triggering higher interest rates.
Employing the classification among the four finance regimes, the following liquidity index (LI) is constructed and proposed:
The financial fragility of the government increases as the liquidity index becomes lower. The government is: (i) hedge when the index is higher than 1; (ii) speculative when the index takes values between 0 and 1; (iii) Ponzi when the index lies between -1 and 0; and (iv) ultra-Ponzi when the index takes values between -2 and -1. (2) The debt maturity index is defined as the ratio of long-term (higher than 5 years) debt to total debt. This index provides a general picture of the time profile of the government's principal repayment commitments. Minsky has pointed out the importance of debt maturity in the determination of the financial posture of an economic unit (see, e.g. Minsky [1986 Minsky [ ] 2008 . The higher the maturity the longer the horizon over which a specific debt must be repaid and, therefore, the lower the debt commitments in the short run. However, the relationship of the debt maturity index with the government's financial fragility is not straightforward. If the deficit of a government is expected to be higher in the short run rather than in the long run, a 12 longer maturity is beneficial for the government's financial position. When the opposite holds, a longer maturity might lead to higher financial pressure in the long run. Government's financial fragility depends, therefore, on the decisions of the fiscal authorities about the 'optimal' combination of long-term and short-term debt. These decisions should rely not only on the expected fiscal balance but also on the expected conditions in the financial markets. However, irrespective of the expectations, it could be asserted that policy makers should keep a relatively small amount of the government debt in the form of short-term liabilities. This prevents continuous refinancing from the markets. At the same time, though, they should avoid deferring the majority of the debt repayments in the future.
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(3) The liquid assets to debt ratio is defined as the proportion of government's currency and deposits to its gross debt. In general, the higher the liquid assets held by economic units (relative to their debt) the easier it is to deal with unforeseen contingencies related to the fulfillment of their financial obligations (see, e.g. Minsky [1986 Tymoigne 2009, 133) . For the government, a high liquid assets to debt ratio implies that it can more easily use available cash in periods in which revenues and external finance availability might not be enough to cover expenditures and debt commitments.
(4) The shares to debt ratio is given by the value of the shares and other equity of the government relative to its gross debt. This index shows the extent to which the sale of financial assets can be used through privatisation for the reduction of the government debt and the fulfillment of government's financial commitments. Some issues should be pointed out. First, this index is sensitive to changes in the market price of 13 government's shares. Euphoric financial conditions are broadly conducive to higher market prices and thus to higher proceeds from privatisations. Contrariwise, in periods of financial distress the market prices of government's shares are more likely to decline, reducing the proceeds from privatisations. Second, the positive cash inflows effects from privatisations in the short run do not necessarily compensate for the foregone revenues due to the sale of the related financial assets (e.g. dividends).
Consequently, the long-run effect of privatisations on the government's financial position cannot be specified a priori.
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(5) The non-resident debt index is defined as the proportion of government debt held by non-residents. Arguably, non-residents are less willing to continue refinancing, especially when the level of the government debt is high (see e.g. Bank of Italy 2011, 14; Broos and de Haan 2012). Thus, the higher the non-resident to total debt ratio the higher, ceteris paribus, the possibility of financial constraints in the case of adverse expectation shocks. It is also noteworthy that when the non-resident debt is high, a significant proportion of the interest payments paid on government's outstanding debt accrues to foreigners, and thus does not contribute to the income of the domestic private sector. This has negative effects on the domestic aggregate demand (see Zezza 2012).
The financial fragility of the Greek government sector

The pre-crisis period
Figure 1 displays the liquidity index for the Greek government sector over the period . 13 We observe that before 2001 the Greek government was either in the financing needs rendered the Greek government sector extremely vulnerable to the expectations of the sovereign bond holders and the speculation in the global financial markets.
An important message from the evolution of the liquidity index after the adoption of the euro in 2001 is that the Greek government made no effort to increase tax revenues and curtail tax evasion during a period of high growth. Government revenues remained low relative to GDP (see Appendix 2). The easiness to roll-over debt via the financial markets motivated the Greek government to rely more on new borrowing.
Significant was also the effect of Greece's structural competitiveness problems on the deterioration of the liquidity index. These problems, which are reflected on its persistent trade deficit (see Appendix 2), restricted the contribution of debt-financed government expenditures to the growth of the domestic product with negative feedback effects on government revenues.
[ Table 1 near here] Table 1 displays the values of the other four indexes that capture the financial fragility of the Greek government sector. We observe the following: First, the debt maturity index increased from 29.5% in 1999 to 56.1% in 2008. This development reflects the fact that in the years just before and after the entrance of Greece in the Eurozone government's new borrowing took place to a great extent via long-term bonds.
Therefore, the adverse effects of the accumulation of debt and financial commitments
were not very apparent in the short run, preventing the liquidity index to further deteriorate over the first years after the entrance in the EMU. This, however, came 
The after-crisis period
The above analysis can lead us to argue that in the late 2000's the Greek public sector was susceptible to a shift in confidence due to its fragile financial structure. This shift In particular, the first bailout programme proposed the liberalisation of labour and product markets, the sharp reduction of government expenditures (and especially of pensions and of public sector employees' wages), the rise in tax rates and the privatisation of state enterprises. Besides, the 'Troika' claimed that wages in the private sector should be cut in order for Greece to restore its international competitiveness through an internal devaluation process. In addition, any discussion about restructuring Greece's unmanageable public debt was totally ruled out by the 'Troika' and the Greek government.
would help out Greece to place the government debt to GDP ratio on a sustainable path and to restore positive growth rates and confidence in order to return to the private capital markets in early 2012. None of these claims were verified. Instead, the economy experienced a deepening recession, 17 the financial instability and the liquidity crisis were enhanced, and the government debt to GDP ratio increased much more than expected.
In Figure 1 we can see the evolution of the LI during the period 2010-2011 in which
Greece implemented the first adjustment programme. Three observations are in order. Overall, the austerity measures incorporated in the first bailout plan did not have the desired effects on the liquidity of the Greek government. The underlying reason is twofold. First, the tax evasion was not significantly reduced because the Greek government failed to adequately reform the tax system in order to substantially restrict the tax evasion of self-employees and capital owners. Second, the recession in the economy and the unemployment rate were much higher than the projected ones. The recessionary effects of fiscal measures were extremely important not only because of their Keynesian impact on domestic demand but also because of the materialisation of 'anti-Ricardian effects': the expectation for more austerity and, thus, for further reduction in incomes, adversely affected private consumption and investment expenditures (see Boyer, 2012) . Moreover, the cuts in private sector wages produced a higher than anticipated reduction in private consumption and the lack of structural competitiveness in the Greek economy, due to its weak and limited productive capacity, constrained the rise of exports. 18 The deeper than expected recession and the higher than expected unemployment had detrimental effects on revenues and on certain government expenditures (e.g. unemployment benefits). Besides, it is important to underline that anytime there was a difference between the actual and the targeted public revenues, the 'Troika' required additional measures, entrapping the economy into a vicious cycle.
In 2011 Greece's government debt was completely unsustainable and unmanageable.
This led the 'Troika' to revise its initial decision of no debt restructuring since it was realised that without a reduction of its debt commitments the Greek government could Figure 1 illustrates that the actual value of the index was -1.34. This deviation between the expected and the actual value of the LI was basically the result of the lower actual total revenues, which were equal to 86.7 billion euros, relative to the targeted ones amounted to 97.7 billion euros. 19 Again, the deeper than expected recession was behind the insufficient amount of government revenues.
Some further developments need to be highlighted. First, the proportion of the Greek government debt held by non-residents increased from 73.3% in 2011 to 83.6% in 2012 (see Table 1 ). This was due to the involvement of Greek banks and private bondholders in the PSI programme that reduced their share in the Greek government debt, as well as due to the increase in the proportion of the Greek government debt held by the official sector (i.e. the IMF and the stability mechanisms of the EU). The rise in the non-resident debt implies a higher reliance on foreigners for the refinancing of debt 20 and a greater redistribution of income from the domestic economy to the external sector. Second, the debt maturity index increased significantly in 2012, reflecting the substitution of longer-term debt for shorter-term one, as a result of the PSI programme and the other measures taken to relieve Greece's burden of debt.
Although this rise in long-term debt is beneficial in the short run, it may have detrimental effects on the financial position of the Greek government in the long run.
Third, the shares to debt ratio increased from 9.6% in 2011 to 21.6% in 2012, but this was largely due to the acquisition of shares by the Greek government in the context of its support to the financial sector (see Eurostat 2013) . Fourth, the credit to GDP ratio of the private sector further increased in the after-crisis period (see Appendix 2) and the rate of non-performing loans achieved a record high in 2012, revealing an extremely fragile private sector.
Regarding the prospects of the government's financial position in the future, it can be asserted that these crucially depend on the stance of the other sectors of the economy.
According to the 'financial balances approach', the targeted decline in Greece's budget deficit prerequisites the deterioration in the balance of the private and/or the foreign sector. There are, arguably, three alternative scenarios in the coming years if the current economic policy continues to be implemented without a new debt relief.
The first scenario is that the private and the foreign sector will sufficiently decrease their balances basically by spending more. Under this scenario, the desired decline in the fiscal deficit can be achieved without leading to lower output. The second scenario is that these two sectors will not spend enough and the resulting decline in GDP (due to the fact that private expenditures and exports will not counter the negative impact of fiscal measures on output) will make lower the saving of the private sector and the imports of the economy, without any significant negative effect on the government revenues. In this case, the desired decline in the government budget deficit will approximately be attained (potentially with some additional austerity measures), but at the cost of a lower output, with unfavourable effects on the debt to GDP dynamics.
The third scenario is the same with the second one with the only difference being that the fiscal consolidation and the deepening recession will generate, due to automatic stabilisers, lower than the expected revenues and higher than the expected expenditures, preventing the targeted fiscal deficit from being achieved.
Our argument is that the private sector is not likely to spend enough and that a substantial increase in country's exports will not occur due to Greece's structural competitiveness problems (see also Papadimitrou, Nikiforos, and Zezza 2013) . It is 24 also plausible that the resulting reduction in GDP will have important adverse effects on government revenues. Thus, we contend that the third scenario is the most probable one. Moreover, as long as the Greek debt continues to be considered unsustainable, the liquidity and solvency problems will be reinforced and will rapidly multiply and spread to the economy increasing financial instability. In this case,
Greece will continue to evolve through a debt-deflation process with catastrophic employment, growth and wealth effects that will further reduce the government sector's ability to make lower its financial fragility and to meet its debt commitments.
Conclusions
In this paper, Minskyan financial fragility indices for the government sector have been shown that certain features of the government's financial structure (the ratio of nonresident to total debt, the liquid assets to debt ratio and the shares to debt ratio) either deteriorated or did not improve in the pre-crisis period, contributing to the financial fragility of the Greek government sector.
The paper has also pinpointed that, contrary to the expectations of the 'Troika', the austerity measures incorporated in the first and the second adjustment programmes for
Greece did not improve significantly the financial fragility of the Greek government sector in the after-crisis period. The implemented policy has caused a prolonged 25 recession, which has systematically exerted a negative feedback impact on the government revenues undermining the government sector's capacity to attain a primary fiscal surplus. As a result, the Greek government sector has not so far shifted from the ultra-Ponzi to the Ponzi regime. In addition, the government debt to GDP ratio has not been placed on a sustainable path and no important improvement has been reported in other features of the Greek government's financial structure. Overall, our analysis disputes the effectiveness of the conducted neoliberal programmes in Greece in terms of creating the conditions for the government to meet its debt commitments, as well as in terms of restoring government sector's solvency, credibility and financial viability.
1. The financial posture of the government sector can also be important in the case of sovereign countries, in so far as the fiscal balance affects the external balance. In particular, under fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal deficits are likely to cause an undesirable reduction in international reserves (see Wray 2006) . Under flexible exchange rate regimes, fiscal deficits can lead to domestic exchange rate depreciation, with potential detrimental effects on inflation and the ability of a country to meet its financial commitments denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, in both regimes fiscal deficits may have adverse effects on the interest rates. However, in non-sovereign countries the risks stemming from a financially fragile government sector are, arguably, more significant and straightforward.
2. Of course, even if the ECB was authorised to operate as 'lender of last resort', this would not eliminate all risks of partial default for bond holders. In particular, both the exchange rate risk and the inflation risk would still exist. However, the main source of default risk would not be present.
3. On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme.
Through this programme the ECB committed to set a floor to the price of government bonds by making unlimited purchases in the secondary sovereign market. The OMT framework has substantially promoted ECB's role as 'lender of last resort' to national governments. However, it has not arguably rendered the ECB a full 'lender of last resort' to the public sector basically for two main reasons. First, the ECB continues to be prohibited to intervene in the primary bonds market.
Second, a necessary condition for a country to qualify for bond purchases by the ECB is to have beforehand committed to some kind of austerity programme. The latter implies that the ECB supports the fiscal policies of Eurozone national governments only when it approves them.
4. Although Minsky's original classification relies on three finance regimes, in the case of government it seems appropriate to extend Minsky's taxonomy by introducing a fourth finance regime (the ultra-Ponzi one), which reflects the case of a government running a primary deficit. Note that Arestis and Glickman (2002) 9. Note that the mathematical formula used in the cases of hedge and speculative finance is the same.
Moreover, the mathematical formula is almost identical in the cases of the Ponzi and the ultra-Ponzi finance: the only difference is that in the case of the ultra-Ponzi regime, -1 has been added to penalise for the existence of a primary deficit. In this way it is ensured that the index for a government that runs a primary deficit always lies between -2 and -1. This enables a clear distinction between a Ponzi and an ultra-Ponzi regime.
10. In Ferrari-Filho, Terra, and Conceição (2010) when the index is higher than one, the government sector is hedge: total revenues are larger than the sum of total primary expenditures, interest and amortisation. If the index lies between zero and one, the government sector is speculative: the primary budget surplus is unable to cover the sum of interest and amortisation. If the index is negative, the government sector is Ponzi: the public sector runs a primary budget deficit.
11. For further discussion on this issue see Wolswijk and de Haan (2005) and Blommestein, Keskinler, and Flores (2011) .
12. An additional index that could be used for the evaluation of government's financial fragility is the non-financial assets to debt ratio. In this paper such an index is not utilised because there are no available data for the non-financial assets of the Greek government sector (see Bova et al. 2013 ).
Note, however, that the role of these assets is to some extent taken into account in our analysis: the proceeds from the sale of non-financial assets are reported in government primary expenditures as negative gross fixed capital formation (see Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama 2006, 3287) Second, as pointed out in footnote 1, the financial posture of the government sector can also be important in the case of sovereign countries. For the other financial fragility indices the analysis starts from the year 1999, i.e. the year that the European Monetary Union (EMU) was set up.
14. In Appendix 2 the real pre-tax interest rate has been used instead of the real after-tax interest rate due to the absence of available data for the tax rate on interest payments.
15. See Papadimitriou, Wray, and Nersisyan (2010) .
16. The only countries that report (on average) lower liquid assets to debt ratios than Greece over this period are France, Italy and Belgium. On the contrary, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and Germany turn out to hold on average above 10% of their debt in the form of currency and deposits.
17. In particular, the growth rate of GDP was -4. 9%, -7.1% and -6.4% in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. The unemployment rate increased from 9.5% in 2009 to 24.3% in 2012 (see Appendix 2).
18. The exports of Greece were also negatively influenced by the recession or weak economic growth in its trade partners.
19. An additional reason is the capital transfer expenditures for banks' resolution, amounted to 8.4
billion euros in 2012. The recording of these transfers is provisional and subject to revision, since the fair value of the assets of banks under liquidation has not yet been provided (see Hellenic Statistical Authority 2013). However, even if these expenditures are not taken into account the value of the liquidity index is still lower than the expected one.
20. Needless to say, since the main foreign lender of Greece is now the official and not the private sector, the reliance on non-residents for the refinancing of the Greek government debt is of different nature relative to the pre-crisis period. This reliance is now more closely related to political decisions. Credit to GDP ratio Ratio of non-financial private debt to gross domestic product at market prices, in percent (%). 
